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Abstract
In the secure groupcast problem, a transmitter wants to securely groupcast a message with
the maximum rate to the first N of K receivers by broadcasting with the minimum bandwidth,
where the K receivers are each equipped with a key variable from a known joint distribution.
Examples are provided to prove that different instances of secure groupcast that have the same
entropic structure, i.e., the same entropy for all subsets of the key variables, can have different
maximum groupcast rates and different minimum broadcast bandwidth. Thus, extra-entropic
structure matters for secure groupcast. Next, the maximum groupcast rate is explored when the
key variables are generic linear combinations of a basis set of independent key symbols, i.e., the
keys lie in generic subspaces. The maximum groupcast rate is characterized when the dimension
of each key subspace is either small or large, i.e., the extreme regimes. For the intermediate
regime, various interference alignment schemes originated from wireless interference networks,
such as eigenvector based and asymptotic schemes, are shown to be useful.
Hua Sun (email: hua.sun@unt.edu) is with the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University of North
Texas.
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1 Introduction
Building an efficient secure communication network is a central problem in information theory, for
which insights are obtained from studying canonical system models, e.g., ideas for secure point-
to-point communication protocols emerge out of the study of Shannon’s one-time pad system [1].
Aiming to shed light on secure group communication protocols, we consider a recently proposed
multi-user extension of the one-time pad system - secure groupcast [2].
In secure groupcast, a transmitter wishes to communicate a common message W of LW bits
to the first N of K receivers, i.e., the last E = K −N receivers are eavesdroppers. Each receiver
k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} shares a key variable Zk with the transmitter. The key variables (Z1, · · · , ZK) are
L length extensions of a discrete memoryless source with a known joint distribution. The message
is groupcast through broadcasting a signal X of LX bits to every receiver such that combining with
the known key Zk, qualified Receiver k ∈ {1, · · · , N} can recover W while eavesdropping Receiver
k ∈ {N + 1, · · · ,K} learns nothing about W . The communication performance is measured by
the secure groupcast rate R = LW /L and the broadcast bandwidth β = LX/L. We naturally look
for secure groupcast schemes with the maximum groupcast rate, termed the capacity C, and the
minimum broadcast bandwidth β∗.
The first question studied in this work is whether C and β∗ can always be described by the entropy
of all subsets of the key variables (Z1, · · · , ZK), i.e., are entropy measures sufficient to characterize
the capacity and the minimum broadcast bandwidth for secure groupcast? The answer turns out
to be negative. To show this, we construct two secure groupcast instances with N = 2 qualified
receivers and E = 1 eavesdropping receiver (i.e., K = 3) such that the entropy of all 23−1 subsets of
(Z1, Z2, Z3) and the capacity C are identical, while the minimum broadcast bandwidth β
∗ required
to achieve the capacity is different. As a result, β∗ is not a function of only the entropy measures
of the key variables, and extra-entropic structure matters. Along the similar line, we construct two
secure groupcast instances with N = 2 qualified receivers and E = 2 eavesdropping receivers (i.e.,
K = 4) with the same entropy of all subsets of (Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4), while the capacity C is different.
Therefore, C cannot be expressed as a function of only the entropy measures of the key variables.
The necessity of extra-entropic structures is related to one of the biggest mysteries in network
information theory, i.e., the involvement of auxiliary variables in capacity characterizations. If C, β∗
may have a closed-form characterization in terms of entropy measures, we need to invoke (highly
non-trivial) auxiliary variables (beyond the K keys) that do not appear in the problem statement.
The role of extra-entropic structures might lurk under many network information theory problems
and has started to be revealed, e.g., in the context of computation broadcast [3].
The instances constructed in studying the first question above turn out to have linear keys, i.e.,
the key variables are linear combinations of a basis set of independent symbols, and the optimal
achievable schemes are based on vector linear coding. This motivates us to delve deeper into the
secure groupcast problem with linear keys. Another reason for linear keys and linear schemes to be
interesting is that even the more preliminary form of combinatorial keys (i.e., independent uncoded
keys that are shared among subsets of receivers) requires sophisticated design of the signal spaces
used by the key variables (Z1, · · · , ZK) and the message W , in forming the transmit signal X.
As such, we wish to understand the necessary and sufficient condition for a linear scheme to be
feasible, i.e., the linear feasibility question. Last but not least, when the key variables are subject
to design (i.e., the compound secure groupcast problem [4]), the tradeoff between key storage and
broadcast bandwidth remains open and all known schemes are linear. The understanding of linear
schemes will help the design of key variables. The considerations listed above lead us to the second
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question, where we study the natural set-up of generic linear keys.
The second question studied in this work is the capacity characterization of secure groupcast
with generic linear keys, i.e., for one key block, each key variable consists of d linear combina-
tions of m independent basis key symbols. Further, the linear combination coefficients are drawn
independently and uniformly from a finite field. We focus on the case where the finite field is
sufficiently large and study the capacity characterization for almost all cases (i.e., results that hold
almost surely). In other words, the setting studied is where the key space of each receiver is a
generic d-dimensional subspace from an m-dimensional overall key space. Interestingly, the ca-
pacity C depends crucially on ratio of the key space dimension seen by each receiver to the total
key dimension, i.e., d/m, whose reciprocal γ = m/d can be viewed as the space expansion factor.
When γ is large, the key subspaces are far apart from each other such that the groupcast rate
will be higher; when γ is small, the key subspaces are overlapping to a large extent such that
the groupcast rate will be lower. We show that for any number of qualified receivers N and any
number of eavesdropping receivers E, the capacity is C/d = 1 when γ ≥ min(N + 1, E + 1) and
C/d = γ − 1 when γ ≤ max(1 + 1/N, 1 + 1/E). When either N = 1 (secure unicast) or E = 1
(secure multicast), the capacity is characterized for all possible γ. This result is generalized along
two lines. For the first line, we consider the simplest uncovered setting where N = 2, E = 2, and
provide partial characterization for the remaining regimes of 3/2 < γ < 3. For the second line, we
fix γ = 2 (i.e., each key subspace has half the dimension of the overall key space), and add more
qualified or eavesdropping receivers to the basic N = 2, E = 2 system. In particular, we show that
if we add one qualified or eavesdropping receiver, i.e., set N = 3 or E = 3, then the earliest known
interference alignment schemes, first appeared in the 2 user wireless X network [5], are useful; if
we add 2 qualified or eavesdropping receivers, i.e., set N = 4 or E = 4, then eigenvector based
interference alignment schemes, originated from the 3 user wireless interference network [6], can
be applied; if we further add more qualified receivers or eavesdropping receivers, i.e., set N > 4 or
E > 4, then asymptotic interference alignment schemes, which lie in the core of the canonical half-
the-cake result for wireless interference networks [6, 7], play significant roles. Ideas that resemble
the wireless counterpart appear in secure groupcast, e.g., spatial normalization, diagonal channel
coefficients, over-constrained linear systems, duality, and space overlaps. We will go through these
ideas in the following sections of this work.
Notation: For positive integers K1,K2,K1 ≤ K2, we use the notation [K1 : K2] = {K1,K1 +
1, · · · ,K2}. Define the notation ZK1:K2 as the vector (ZK1 ; · · · ;ZK2) if K1 ≤ K2 and as the null
vector otherwise. The notation |Q| is used to denote the cardinality of a set Q. We use 0 to denote
a matrix whose each element is 0 and use Id×d to denote the identity matrix of dimension d. For
a matrix H, H(i : j, :) is used to denote the sub-matrix of H formed by retaining only the i-th row
to the j-th row.
2 Problem Statement
Consider K discrete random variables z1, · · · , zK of finite cardinality, drawn from an arbitrary
joint distribution Pz1,··· ,zK . In this work, we focus on the linear setting, where zk, k ∈ [1 : K]
are arbitrary linear combinations of a basis set of independent symbols from a finite field. Let
the basis symbols be specified through the m × 1 column vector s = (s1; · · · ; sm) = s1:m, where
si, i ∈ [1 : m] are i.i.d. uniform symbols from a finite field Fp for a prime power p. Since all variables
zk are linear combinations of the basis symbols, they are represented by 1 × m vectors of linear
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combining coefficients. Each variable zk is then specified in terms of such vectors, zk = Hks, where
Hk ∈ Fd×mp , and each zk contains d symbols from Fp, where each symbol is a linear combination
of the basis symbols with coefficients specified by one row vector of Hk. Z1, · · · , ZK are L length
extensions of z1, · · · , zK , where each block Z1(l), · · · , ZK(l) is produced i.i.d. according to Pz1,··· ,zK .
The secure groupcast problem is comprised of a transmitter and K receivers. The key variable
Zk is shared between the transmitter and Receiver k. The transmitter wishes to send a message
W that has LW i.i.d. uniform symbols from Fp and is independent of the key variables Z1, · · · , ZK
to the first N < K receivers.
H(W ) = LW (in p-ary units), (1)
I(W ;Z1, · · · , ZK) = 0. (2)
To securely groupcast the message W , the transmitter broadcasts a signal X of LX symbols from
Fp to every receiver. Each qualified receiver can decode W with no error1.
[Correctness] H(W |X,Zk) = 0, ∀k ∈ [1 : N ]. (3)
Each unqualified (eavesdropping) receiver learns no information about W .
[Security] I(W ;X,Zk) = 0,∀k ∈ [N + 1 : K]. (4)
The secure groupcast rate characterizes how many symbols of the message are securely groupcast
per key block and the broadcast bandwidth characterizes how many symbols of the transmit signal
are broadcast per key block to securely groupcast a message of certain rate.
R =
LW
L
, β(R) =
LX
L
. (5)
A rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a secure groupcast scheme (that satisfies the
correctness constraint (3) and the security constraint (4)) of rate greater than or equal to R. The
supremum of achievable rates is called the capacity C. A broadcast bandwidth β(R) is said to
be achievable if there exists a secure groupcast scheme of rate greater than or equal to R and
of broadcast bandwidth smaller than or equal to β(R). The infimum of achievable broadcast
bandwidth is called the minimum broadcast bandwidth β∗(R).
2.1 Preliminary Result
We recall a useful converse result on R and β(R) that is stated in the following theorem and will
be used later. The proof can be found in [2].
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in [2]) For the secure groupcast problem, we have
R ≤ H(zq|ze), ∀q ∈ [1 : N ],∀e ∈ [N + 1 : K], (6)
β(R) ≥ I(X;W,Z1:K |Ue)/L ≥ |Q|R−
( |Q|∑
i=1
H(zqi |ue)−H(zq1 , · · · , zq|Q| |ue)
)
,
∀Q = {q1, · · · , q|Q|} ⊂ [1 : N ], ∀e ∈ [N + 1 : K], ∀ue s.t. H(ue|ze) = 0. (7)
1For the linear key setting, all achievable schemes of this work (except that in Section 6.5.2) have zero error and
zero leakage. Note that all converse results of this work also hold under  error and  leakage.
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3 Extra-Entropic Structure
In this section, we consider the question if the capacity C and the minimum broadcast bandwidth
for capacity achieving schemes β∗(C) can be characterized by the entropy of all subsets of the key
variables. Our result shows that the answer is no in general.
Theorem 2 There exist instances of the secure groupcast problem where the entropy structure of
the key variables and the capacity C are the same, while the minimum broadcast bandwidth β∗(C)
is different; there exist instances of the secure groupcast problem where the entropy structure of the
key variables is the same while the capacity values C are different. Thus extra-entropic structure
matters for secure groupcast.
Proof: First, consider β∗(C). We present two instances of secure groupcast, say SG1,SG2,
that have the same entropy values of all subsets of the key variables and the same capacity. Yet,
these two instances have different minimum broadcast bandwidth for capacity achieving schemes.
Incidentally, both instances have linear keys and are specified as follows. For both instances2,
N = 2,K = 3 and each key variable consists of d = 2 linear combinations of m = 3 basis key
symbols s1, s2, s3 from any field Fp.
SG1 : z1 = (s1; s2), z2 = (s1; s3), z3 = (s2; s3);
SG2 : z1 = (s1; s2), z2 = (s1; s3), z3 = (s1; s2 + s3).
(8)
The entropy values of all subsets of (z1, z2, z3) are found as follows.
H(zi) = 2, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, H(zi, zj) = H(z1, z2, z3) = 3, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i 6= j. (9)
So the entropy structure of both SG1 and SG2 is the same. We next characterize the capacity and
the minimum broadcast bandwidth for both instances.
SG1 : CSG1 = 1, β
∗
SG1
(C) = 1. (10)
Rate Converse: R ≤ H(z1|z3) = 1 (set q = 1, e = 3 in (6) of Theorem 1). (11)
Bandwidth Converse: β(C) ≥ C = 1 (set Q = {1}, ue = () in (7)). (12)
Achievability: X = W + s1. (13)
SG2 : CSG2 = 1, β
∗
SG2
(C) = 2. (14)
Rate Converse: R ≤ H(z1|z3) = 1 (set q = 1, e = 3 in (6) of Theorem 1). (15)
Bandwidth Converse: β(C) ≥ 2C − (H(z1|s1) +H(z2|s1)−H(z1, z2|s1)) (16)
= 2 (set Q = {1, 2}, e = 3, ue = s1 in (7)). (17)
Achievability: X = (W + s2;−W + s3). (18)
Note that we use L = 1 key block so that Zi = zi and W has LW = 1 symbol. Therefore while the
capacity for SG1, SG2 is the same, the minimum broadcast bandwidth is different. A closer look at
the proof reveals that the converse bound (7) has an auxiliary variable ue that might need to be
set differently for different secure groupcast instances.
2The parameters N = 2,K = 3 are the smallest so that the instances are the simplest, because if N = 1 (single
qualified receiver, i.e., the secure unicast setting), then β∗(C) = mine∈[2:K]H(z1|ze) is fully characterized by the
entropy structure of the key variables (see Theorem 9 in [2]).
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Second, consider C. We present two instances of secure groupcast, say SG3, SG4, that have
the same entropy values of all subsets of the key variables. Yet, these two instances have different
capacity values. For both instances3, N = 2,K = 4, the keys are linear, and each key variable
consists of d = 9 linear combinations of m = 15 basis key symbols s1, · · · , s15 from field Fp, where
p ≥ 5 is a prime.
SG3 : z1 = (s1:3; s4:6; s7:9)
z2 = (s1:3; s10:12; s13:15)
z3 = (s4:6; s10:12; s1:3 + s4:6 + s7:9 + s10:12 + s13:15)
z4 = (s7:9; s13:15; s1:3 + s4:6 + s7:9 + s10:12 + s13:15)
SG4 : z1 = (s1:3; s4:6; s10:12)
z2 = (s1:3; s7:9; s13:15)
z3 = (s1:3; s4 + s7; s5 + s8; s6 + s9; s10 + s13; s11 + s14; s12 + s15)
z4 = (s1:3; s4 + 2s7; s5 + 3s8; s6 + 4s9; s10 + 2s13; s11 + 3s14; s12 + 4s15).
(19)
The entropy values of all subsets of (z1, z2, z3, z4) are found as follows.
H(zi) = 9, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, (20)
H(zi, zj) = H(zi, zj , zk) = H(z1, z2, z3, z4) = 15,∀i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, i 6= j. (21)
So the entropy structure of both SG3 and SG4 is the same. The capacity of SG3 is characterized
as follows. W = (W1:3;W4:6) has LW = 6 symbols and we use L = 1 key block.
SG3 : CSG3 = 6.
Converse: R ≤ H(z1|z3) = 6 (set q = 1, e = 3 in (6) of Theorem 1).
Achievability: X =
 W1:3 + s1:3W4:6 + s4:6 + s7:9
−W1:3 −W4:6 + s10:12 + s13:15
 . (22)
Correctness and security can be easily verified. The capacity of SG4 is more involved (e.g., the
converse from Theorem 1 no longer suffices) and the result is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For the secure groupcast instance SG4, the capacity is CSG4 = 4.
The proof is deferred to Section 6.1 and an outline is given here. The symbols s1:3 are useless
as all receivers know them. The remaining 6 key symbols for each receiver can be divided into
2 groups, and each group is essentially a generic secure groupcast instance, where each receiver
has a 3-dimensional key subspace in general position of a 6-dimensional space, e.g., for one group,
Receiver 1 has s4:6, Receiver 2 has s7:9, Receiver 3 has (s4 + s7; s5 + s8; s6 + s9), and Receiver 4
has (s4 + 2s7; s5 + 3s8; s6 + 4s9). This generic secure groupcast instance will be settled in Theorem
4 and the capacity is 2 so that for 2 groups with independent keys, the capacity of SG4 is 4. The
insights of Theorem 4 can be generalized to produce the proof of Lemma 1 (see Section 6.1).
Therefore while the entropy structure of SG3,SG4 is the same, the capacity values are different.
Extra-entropic structure matters and the proof of Theorem 2 is complete.
3N = 2,K = 4 is the simplest setting, because if either N = 1 or K −N = 1 (secure unicast or secure multicast),
then the capacity is fully characterized by the entropy structure of the key variables (see Theorem 9 in [2]).
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4 Linear Feasibility
In this section, we characterize the feasibility condition of a linear secure groupcast scheme under
the linear key setting. Note that while the achievable rates defined in the problem statement section
are not restricted to linear schemes, linear schemes are of interest because on the one hand they
are simple, and on the other hand they often turn out to be optimal for linear keys.
Linear Scheme: For a linear secure groupcast scheme with linear keys, zk = Hks,Hk ∈ Fd×mp , s ∈
Fm×1p , the transmit signal
X = VWW +Vs, VW ∈ FLX×LWp ,W ∈ FLW×1p ,V ∈ FLX×mp (23)
is specified by two full rank4 precoding matrices, VW for the message W and V for the key variables
s such that the following properties are satisfied.
• Identify the overlap of the key space of X and the key space of Receiver k ∈ [1 : K], i.e., find
matrices Pk and Uk of the maximum rank (if exist) such that
5
UkV = PkHk, (24)
then the projection of W in X to the Uk space satisfies
[Correctness] rank(UkVW ) = LW , ∀k ∈ [1 : N ], (25)
[Security] UkVW = 0, ∀k ∈ [N + 1 : K]. (26)
The rate achieved is R = LW and the broadcast bandwidth achieved is β(R) = LX as L = 1.
Generalizations to L > 1 are immediate.
Note that the precoding matrices VW , V and the key matrices Hk are constants and are
assumed globally known to the transmitter and all receivers, so that it is straightforward to find
the projection matrices Uk,Pk and verify the feasibility condition. We show that the correctness
constraint (25) and the security constraint (26) for linear schemes implies the entropic versions (3)
and (4). For correctness, we have
UkX = UkVWW +UkVs
(24)
= UkVWW +PkHks (27)
⇒ UkX −PkHks = UkVWW (25)←→W, ∀k ∈ [1 : N ] (28)
⇒ H(W |X,Zk) = 0 (29)
where A ←→ B means that the two matrices A,B are invertible. For security, we use the fact
that PkHk contains all row vectors of Hk that can be expressed as linear combinations of the row
vectors of V (i.e., all overlaps) so that the row space of the remaining vectors is orthogonal to the
row space of V.
Hk ←→ (PkHk;QkHk)⇒ rowspan(QkHk) is independent of rowspan(V). (30)
4We assume without loss of generality that V ∈ FLX×mp has full row rank, i.e., rank(V) = LX ≤ m. Otherwise,
some row of V is a linear combination of other rows and due to the security constraint (4), the corresponding linear
combinations of VW must be zero. As a result, some row of the transmit signal X is a linear combination of other
rows, i.e., X contains some redundant row that does not need to be sent.
5Equivalently, rank(Uk) = rank(Pk) = dim(rowspan(V) ∩ rowspan(Hk)).
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Then we have ∀k ∈ [N + 1 : K]
I(W ;X,Zk)
(2)
= I(W ;X,PkHks | QkHks) (31)
(26)
= I(W ;X | QkHks) (32)
= H(X | QkHks)−H(X |W,QkHks) (33)
(2)
≤ LX −H(Vs | QkHks) (34)
(30)
= LX −H(Vs) = 0 (35)
where in the last step, we use the fact that V ∈ FLX×mp has full row rank, i.e., H(Vs) = rank(V) =
LX . From now on, we will employ the simplified correctness and security constraints (25), (26) for
achievability proofs of linear schemes.
Evidently, the conditions (25) and (26) are necessary as otherwise, either the qualified receiver
cannot decode the desired message (refer to (25)) or the eavesdropping receiver can obtain some
linear combination of the message symbols (refer to (26)).
5 Generic Secure Groupcast
In this section, we study the secure groupcast problem when the keys are generic linear combinations
of the basis symbols, abbreviated as generic secure groupcast. In particular, zk = Hks, where
each element of Hk ∈ Fd×mp is drawn independently and uniformly from Fp for a large p. (36)
Define γ = m/d ∈ Q as the ratio of the dimension of the overall key space to the dimension of
the generic key subspace seen by each receiver. It is convenient to adopt the normalization of the
groupcast rate by d, R/d as the rate measure. We denote the number of eavesdropping receivers
by E = K −N , to simplify the notations. The maximum normalized rate is characterized when γ
is either small or large, in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 For generic secure groupcast with N qualified receivers and E eavesdropping receivers,
when the key of each receiver consists of d generic linear combinations of m = γd ≥ d basis symbols,
the capacity is
C/d = 1, when γ ≥ min(N + 1, E + 1); (37)
C/d = γ − 1, when 1 ≤ γ ≤ max(1 + 1/N, 1 + 1/E) (38)
almost surely.
The result in Theorem 3 is plotted in Fig. 1. The detailed proof of Theorem 3 is presented in
Section 6.2. To illustrate the idea in a simpler setting, we give a few examples here.
Example 1 (Large γ) Suppose we have N = 2 qualified receivers and E = 3 eavesdropping re-
ceivers. From Theorem 3, we know that as long as γ ≥ min(3, 4) = 3, then C/d = 1. Suppose
γ = 3, e.g., d = 1,m = γd = 3 so that each receiver has d = 1 generic linear combination of m = 3
basis key symbols s1, s2, s3, as the key zk. We show that the capacity is C = d = 1. Converse
follows immediately from (6) in Theorem 1, R ≤ H(zq|ze) = 1, ∀q ∈ {1, 2}, ∀e ∈ {3, 4, 5}. Note
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Figure 1: Normalized generic secure groupcast capacity C/d as a function of space expansion factor γ = m/d.
that zq, ze each lies in a 1-dimensional subspace in general position of a 3-dimensional space so that
zq, ze are linearly independent almost surely. Achievability is proved as follows. We simply send
the sum of the message symbol and each key of qualified receivers, i.e., the transmit signal is set as
X = (W + z1;W + z2) (39)
where X ∈ F2×1p ,W ∈ Fp. Correctness is easy to see - referring to (25), the overlap of the key space
of X and the key space of qualified Receiver q is zq and the projection of the message space to zq is
W , from which W can be decoded with no error. Security is guaranteed, because referring to (26),
the overlap of the key space of X and the key space of eavesdropping Receiver e is null because the
key in X has 2 dimensions in general position, which is independent of the 1-dimensional key space
ze almost surely. In other words, the messages are sent along the qualified key spaces, which are
independent of each eavesdropping key space almost surely.
The above case satisfies N ≤ E and when N > E, a different idea is required. Suppose N =
3, E = 2, γ = min(4, 3) = 3. Similarly, suppose d = 1,m = 3, i.e., each key space is a 1-dimensional
generic subspace of a 3-dimensional space. We show that C = d = 1. The converse proof is same
as above and we consider achievability. The transmit signal is designed as
X = VWW + s (40)
where X,VW , s ∈ F3×1p ,W ∈ Fp and VW is chosen so that[
H4
H5
]
2×3
VW = 02×1, (41)
i.e., VW lies in the right null space of each eavesdropping key space. Such a (1-dimensional) null
space exists because the overall key space has 3 dimensions and the 2 eavesdropping receivers see
a generic 2-dimensional subspace collectively. Correctness constraint (25) holds, because X uses
the full key space such that its overlap with each qualified key space is zq, and the projection of
the message space VWW to zq is not zero almost surely, i.e., HqVW 6= 0, ∀q ∈ {1, 2, 3} (note that
VW is determined fully by the eavesdropping key space and is independent of the qualified key space
almost surely). Security constraint (26) holds because of the design of VW (refer to (41)). To sum
up, the message is sent along the null space of the eavesdropping key spaces, whose projection to
each qualified key space is not null almost surely.
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Finally, we note that the idea of the achievable scheme for the above two cases are similar to
that for the minimum key storage extreme point of the compound secure groupcast problem [4].
Example 2 (Small γ) Similar to the large γ regime, we also have 2 cases for the small γ regime,
depending on N ≤ E or N > E. The 2 cases require different ideas and are considered sequentially.
First, suppose N = 2, E = 3. Theorem 3 states that if γ ≤ max(1 + 1/2, 1 + 1/3) = 3/2,
then C/d = γ − 1. To illustrate this, suppose γ = 3/2, e.g., d = 2,m = γd = 3 so that each
zk consists of 2 generic linear combinations of 3 basis key symbols s1, s2, s3. We show that the
capacity is C = d(γ − 1) = m − d = 1. Converse follows from (6) in Theorem 1, R ≤ H(zq|ze) =
H(zq, ze) −H(ze) = H(s1, s2, s3) −H(ze) = 3 − 2 = 1,∀q ∈ {1, 2},∀e ∈ {3, 4, 5}. Note that zq, ze
each lies in a 2-dimensional subspace in general position of a 3-dimensional space so that they
have full rank collectively almost surely. Achievability follows from the fact that the 2 generic 2-
dimensional qualified key spaces z1, z2 have 1-dimensional overlap in the 3-dimensional overall key
space with high probability. Denote this row vector as HQ so that
rowspan(HQ) = rowspan(H1) ∩ rowspan(H2). (42)
Then the transmit signal is set as
X = W +HQs (43)
where X,W ∈ Fp,HQ ∈ F1×3p , s ∈ F3×1p . Correctness constraint (25) follows from the construction
that HQ lies in the key space of each qualified receiver (see (42)), so HQs and W are recoverable.
Security constraint (26) follows from the observation that the row vector HQ is determined fully by
the qualified key spaces such that it is almost surely independent of each 2-dimensional eavesdropping
generic key space in the 3-dimensional overall key space. As a recap, the qualified key spaces have a
common overlap that is independent of each eavesdropping key space with high probability and this
overlap is used as the common key to send the desired message with one-time pad.
Second, suppose N = 3, E = 2. We set γ = max(1 + 1/3, 1 + 1/2) = 3/2, same as above.
Similarly, suppose d = 2,m = 3, i.e., each key space is a 2-dimensional generic subspace of a
3-dimensional space. We show that C = d(γ − 1) = 1. The converse proof is same as above
while achievability requires a somewhat dual idea. The 2 eavesdropping key spaces z4, z5 each has 2
dimensions and have a 1-dimensional overlap in the 3-dimensional overall key space almost surely.
Denote this row vector as HE so that
rowspan(HE) = rowspan(H4) ∩ rowspan(H5). (44)
Then the transmit signal is set as
X = (HE s; W +Hrand s) (45)
where X ∈ F2×1p ,W ∈ Fp,HE ,Hrand ∈ F1×3p , s ∈ F3×1p and Hrand is a random row vector where
each element is drawn independently and uniformly from Fp. To verify correctness constraint (25),
note that the row vector HE is linearly independent of each 2-dimensional qualified key space in
the 3-dimensional overall key space almost surely, so from (HE s;Hqs),∀q ∈ {1, 2, 3}, each qualified
receiver has 3 generic linear combinations of all basis symbols s and can fully recover s. Then
Hrand s can be obtained and then W is decoded with no error. To verify security constraint (26),
note that HE s is known to each eavesdropping receiver such that no additional information is
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revealed and the row vector Hrand is linearly independent of each 2-dimensional eavesdropping key
space in the 3-dimensional overall key space almost surely. To sum up, the message is sent along
random row vectors and the common overlap of eavesdropping key spaces is broadcast to enable
qualified receiver to recover the key along the random precoding vectors (that are mixed with the
message) and ensure eavesdropping receiver learns no information about the message.
Finally, we note that the idea of the achievable scheme for the above two cases are similar to that
for the minimum broadcast bandwidth extreme point of the compound secure groupcast problem [4].
Note that when N = 1 or E = 1, there is no gap between the γ regimes in Theorem 3 so that
the capacity is fully characterized for all γ values. This result is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For generic secure unicast (N = 1) and generic secure multicast (E = 1), the capacity
is C/d = 1, if γ ≥ 2, and C/d = γ − 1, otherwise 1 ≤ γ ≤ 2 almost surely.
5.1 N = E = 2 and Spatial Normalization
As the settings where either N = 1 or E = 1 are fully understood, we proceed to consider the
simplest open generic secure groupcast problem with N = 2 and E = 2. We start by introducing
the metric - spatial normalized rate and capacity.
The achievable spatial normalized rate of generic secure groupcast, denoted by R(γ), is defined
as R/d if the secure groupcast rate R is achievable when each key zk = Hks and each element of
Hk ∈ Fd×mp is drawn independently and uniformly from Fp for some d and m = γd. Note that the
space expansion factor γ is a constant and we allow scaling of the spatial dimension d and m while
retaining their ratio γ = m/d. The spatial normalized capacity is the supremum of the achievable
rate, C(γ) = supdR(γ) = supdR/d.
Next we explain why we allow spatial normalization, in spite of the fact that symbol extension
along the key block domain already appears in the rate definition (refer to (5)). The reason is that
key block normalization creates structured (specifically, block diagonal with the same block) key
matrices, which are more challenging to deal with, while spatial normalization creates fully generic
key matrices. An example might help to illustrate this point. Suppose N = 2, E = 2 and γ = 2, i.e.,
each receiver sees a generic key subspace that has half dimension of the overall key space. When
d = 1 and m = γd = 2, for one block each key zk = Hks is a generic linear combination of 2 basis
symbols and Hk ∈ F1×2p . Now consider spatial scaling by d = 3 and key block scaling by L = 3.
Spatial Extension: zk = H
ext
k︸︷︷︸
3×6
s︸︷︷︸
6×1
, where each element of Hextk is randomly drawn; (46)
Key Block Extension: Zk =
 Zk(1)Zk(2)
Zk(3)
 =
 Hk 0 00 Hk 0
0 0 Hk

3×6
 s(1)s(2)
s(3)

6×1
(47)
where in key block extension, each block has identical distributions so that the linear combining
coefficients must remain the same. Because of the constant diagonal key matrix structure, the
generic secure groupcast problem is challenging without spatial normalization when we need symbol
extensions (e.g., when the rate is non-integer) but the keys are no longer generic. In wireless
parlance, key block extension corresponds to constant wireless channels with limited diversity [8–10],
which is also a challenging problem in degrees of freedom (DoF) studies and spatial normalization is
exactly the remedy and a commonly used metric in wireless literature [11–14]. Therefore, motivated
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by literature on DoF in wireless communications, we bring spatial normalization to generic secure
groupcast and focus on the spatial normalized capacity for the setting with N = 2, E = 2. We note
that the capacity when spatial normalization is not allowed, i.e., the capacity C as a function of
constant d,m, may not be equal to C(γ)d for every d and remains an open problem in general.
We are now ready to present our results on the spatial normalized capacity for generic secure
groupcast with N = 2, E = 2, in the following theorem.
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Figure 2: For generic secure groupcast with N = 2, E = 2, the spatial normalized capacity C(γ) is
characterized except when 5/3 < γ < 2.
Theorem 4 For generic secure groupcast with 2 qualified receivers and 2 eavesdropping receivers,
the spatial normalized capacity is
C(γ) =

1, γ ≥ 5/2
2(γ − 1)/3, 2 ≤ γ ≤ 5/2
γ − 1, 1 ≤ γ ≤ 5/3
(48)
almost surely.
The result in Theorem 4 is plotted in Fig. 2. Compared with Theorem 3, the small γ regime
where C(γ) = γ − 1 is extended from 1 ≤ γ ≤ 3/2 to include 3/2 ≤ γ ≤ 5/3 and the large γ
regime where C(γ) = 1 is extended from γ ≥ 3 to include 5/2 ≤ γ ≤ 3. In addition, a new regime
2 ≤ γ ≤ 5/2 is established, where C(γ) = 2(γ − 1)/3 and a converse that is tighter than the
conditional entropy bound (6) in Theorem 1 is required. The remaining regime where 5/3 ≤ γ ≤ 2
is open. The proof of Theorem 4 is deferred to Section 6.3 and we give an example of γ = 2 here.
Example 3 (γ = 2) We show that when γ = 2, C(γ) = 2/3. An intuitive explanation of the
converse result for linear schemes is as follows. Suppose rate R is achievable. As γ = 2 so that the
N = 2 qualified receivers have independent keys almost surely, then the transmit signal size must
be at least LX ≥ 2R (refer to (7)), i.e., the dimension of the key space of X must be at least 2R,
rank(V) ≥ 2R (refer to (23)). Each eavesdropping key space has dimension d (rank(Hk) = d), so
that its overlap with the key space of X is at least d+LX−m, i.e., rank(Ue) ≥ d+LX−m, e ∈ {3, 4}
(see (24)). From the security constraint (26), the projection of the message in X to Ue must be
zero, i.e., [U3;U4]VW = 0. Except from the projection to U3,U4, the orthogonal space of the
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message in X has dimension at most LX−2(d+LX−m), from which the message can be recovered
by the correctness constraint (25). Thus
LX − 2(d+ LX −m) ≥ R (49)
⇒ 2m− 2d ≥ R+ LX ≥ 3R (50)
⇒ R(γ) = R/d ≤ 2(γ − 1)/3 γ=2= 2/3. (51)
It is not hard to translate the above argument to an information theoretic converse. In fact, we
have further generalized it to cover a larger range of parameters (see Theorem 5).
Interestingly, the converse argument above naturally leads us to the optimal achievable scheme.
To this end, consider d = 3,m = γd = 6 (note that for spatial normalized rate, we may pick d,m
values as long as the ratio r = m/d is what we want). We present a coding scheme that achieves
R = 2d/3 = 2. Following the insights from (51), the transmit signal shall have dimension 2R = 4
and does not need much special structure, thus it is set as
X = VWW +Vs,VW ∈ F4×2p ,W ∈ F2×1p ,V ∈ F4×6p , s ∈ F6×1p ,
where V = [H1(1 : 2, :);H2(1 : 2, :)] and VW will be specified later. (52)
That is, the first two rows of the key in X are from the key known to qualified Receiver 1 and the
last two key rows in X are known to qualified Receiver 2. Next we identify the overlap of the key
space of X (i.e., rowspan(V)) and the key space of each eavesdropping Receiver e ∈ {3, 4}, i.e.,
rowspan(He),He ∈ F3×6p . For e ∈ {3, 4},
rowspan(UeV) = rowspan(PeHe) = rowspan(V) ∩ rowspan(He), Ue ∈ F1×4p ,Pe ∈ F1×3p
⇒ [Ue −Pe]1×7
[
V
He
]
7×6
= 01×6, i.e., Ue can be obtained from the left null space. (53)
Note that matrices V and He are generic so that the left null space has 1 dimension with high
probability and Ue exists. We are now ready to specify VW . From the security constraint (26), we
have[
U3
U4
]
2×4
VW = 02×2, i.e., VW can be set as column vectors from the right null space. (54)
Finally, to guarantee correctness (25), we need to ensure that qualified Receiver 1 can obtain W
from the first two rows of X (as the keys from the first two rows are known) and the qualified
Receiver 2 can obtain W from the last two rows,
rank
(
VW (1 : 2, :)
)
= 2, rank
(
VW (3 : 4, :)
)
= 2. (55)
The assignment of VW from (54) satisfies the above two rank constraints almost surely, because the
key spaces of each receiver are generic (the coefficients of Hk are randomly drawn). The detailed
proof of this observation is based on the Schwartz-Zippel lemma and appears in Section 6.3.
The converse required for Theorem 4 is a special case of the following general converse result,
whose idea generalizes that described in Example 3.
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Theorem 5 For the secure groupcast problem to the first N of K receivers, suppose the keys of
the eavesdropping receivers are independent, i.e.,
H(zN+1:K) =
K∑
e=N+1
H(ze), (56)
then we have
R+ (K −N − 1)I(X;W,Z1:K |UE)/L ≤ (K −N)H(z1:K |uE)−
K∑
e=N+1
H(ze|uE) (57)
where uE satisfies H(uE |ze) = 0, ∀e ∈ [N + 1 : K], i.e., uE is known to all eavesdropping receivers.
The proof of Theorem 5 is presented in Section 6.4.
5.2 N > 2, E > 2 and Interference Alignment
In this section, we fix γ = 2 and add more qualified or eavesdropping receivers to the N = 2, E = 2
generic secure groupcast system to see if the capacity C(γ = 2) = 2/3 will change. Surprisingly,
through various forms of interference alignment, including additional receivers may not hurt.
Example 4 (Increasing N) Before including additional qualified receivers into the generic secure
groupcast system with N = 2, E = 2, let us first review the insights for the achievable scheme with
the optimal rate R(γ = 2) = 2/3. From Example 3, we set d = 3 so that m = γd = 6, i.e., each
receiver has 3 generic linear combinations of 6 basis systems s = s1:6 as the key. To achieve rate
R = 2d/3 = 2, i.e., send LW = 2 message symbols over L = 1 key block, the transmit signal X has
LX = 4 symbols (refer to (52)). The essential components are as follows.
1. The 4-dimensional key space of X consists of random 2 dimensions from qualified key z1
and random 2 dimensions from qualified key z2, so that each qualified receiver can decode 2
equations on message symbols.
2. The 4-dimensional key space of X has 1-dimensional overlap each with eavesdropping key z3
and z4, respectively. To ensure security, the 2-dimensional message space of X is set to be
orthogonal to the 2-dimensional overlap (both overlaps), which exists as X has 4 dimensions.
Now if we increase N from 2 to 3 (i.e., receivers 1 to 3 are qualified and receivers 4, 5 are eaves-
dropping) and wish to achieve the same rate R = 2, then we need to ensure that the key space of
X has a 2-dimensional overlap with that of the additional qualified receiver. To this end, we can
no longer pick 2 random dimensions from z1 and z2 each, as such a random 4-dimensional key
space will overlap with the newly added 3-dimensional qualified key z3 in 3 + 4− 6 = 1 dimension.
Therefore, we need to pick a 4-dimensional key space that has 2-dimensional overlaps with each of
z1, z2, z3. As γ = 2, each zi, zj pair has no overlap almost surely, so what we need to do is to pick a
2-dimensional subspace of z3 that aligns into the span of the direct sum of 2-dimensional subspaces
of z1, z2. In other words, we only need to change the first point (on correctness) above while the
second point (on security) can be treated similarly (as the subspace of z3 is aligned into those of
z1, z2 so that z3 essentially does not appear).
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The detailed scheme with N = 3 is as follows. We first perform a change of basis operation so
that z1 and z2 are symbols along the standard basis after the transformation.
H12 , [H1; H2]6×6 has full rank almost surely, (58)
new basis s6×1 , H12s, i.e., s = H−112 s (59)
⇒ z1 = H1s = H1H−112 s = [I3×3 03×3]s = s1:3 (60)
z2 = H2s = H2H
−1
12 s = [03×3 I3×3]s = s4:6 (61)
zk = Hks = HkH
−1
12︸ ︷︷ ︸
,[H[1]k H
[2]
k ]
s = H
[1]
k︸︷︷︸
3×3
s1:3 + H
[2]
k︸︷︷︸
3×3
s4:6, ∀k ∈ {3, 4, 5}. (62)
The transmit signal is set as
X = VWW +Vs1:6 = VWW +
[
V1 02×3
02×3 V2
]
s1:6 = VWW +
[
V1s1:3
V2s4:6
]
(63)
where X ∈ F4×1p ,VW ∈ F4×2p ,W ∈ F2×1p ,V ∈ F4×6p ,V1,V2 ∈ F2×3p . Through the above design of the
key space of X, i.e., rowspan(V), z1 and z2 each has a 2-dimensional overlap, i.e., rowspan(V1)
and rowspan(V2), and we consider z3. We wish to guarantee the existence of a 2× 3 matrix V3 so
that
V3z3 = V3(H
[1]
3 s1:3 +H
[2]
3 s4:6) can be obtained from V1s1:3,V2s4:6 (64)
⇐ V1 = V3H[1]3 ,V2 = V3H[2]3 (65)
⇐ We generate V3 generically and set V1,V2 following (65). (66)
The alignment constraints in (65) and the solution are similar to those in 2 user wireless X network
[5]. After V is specified, VW is generated in the same manner as the N = 2 case (see (54) for
detailed steps),
rowspan(VW ) ⊥ rowspan(V) ∩ rowspan(H4), rowspan(V) ∩ rowspan(H5) (67)
so that security (26) is guaranteed. Note that V is fully determined by qualified keys z1, z2, z3. For
correctness (25), we require that VW (1 : 2, :),VW (3 : 4, :),VW (1 : 2, :) +VW (3 : 4, :) each has rank
2 (which holds almost surely by showing each determinant polynomial is not the zero polynomial)
so that Receiver 1, 2, and 3 can decode the desired message, respectively.
Next, what if N is further increased to 4? We use the same transmit signal structure (63) and
naturally have additional alignment constraints due to the new qualified Receiver 4, i.e., we wish to
guarantee that both z3 and z4 have a 2-dimensional overlap with Vs1:6. This is realized by setting
2× 3 matrices V3,V4 so that
V3z3 = V3(H
[1]
3 s1:3 +H
[2]
3 s4:6) can be obtained from V1s1:3,V2s4:6 (68)
V4z4 = V4(H
[1]
4 s1:3 +H
[2]
4 s4:6) can be obtained from V1s1:3,V2s4:6 (69)
⇐ rowspan(V1) = rowspan(V3H[1]3 ) = rowspan(V4H[1]4 )
rowspan(V2) = rowspan(V3H
[2]
3 ) = rowspan(V4H
[2]
4 ) (70)
⇐ rowspan(V3) = rowspan(V3H[2]3 (H[2]4 )−1H[1]4 (H[1]3 )−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Hc
) (71)
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⇐ We set VT3 as the eigenvectors of HTc and then set V1,V2,V4 following (70). (72)
The alignment constraints in (70) and the solution are similar to those in 3 user interference
network [6]. The assignment of VW is exactly the same as above (see (67)). As the overlapping
key space of X for the additional qualified receiver is aligned into those for the original qualified
receivers 1, 2, the proof of correctness and security remains the same.
Finally, suppose we have a large integer N . If we follow the same idea above, the linear systems
will be over-constrained. Following (70), we need to find Vq, q ∈ [1 : N ] so that
rowspan(V1) ≈ rowspan(V3H[1]3 ) ≈ rowspan(V4H[1]4 ) ≈ · · · ≈ rowspan(VNH[1]N )
rowspan(V2) ≈ rowspan(V3H[2]3 ) ≈ rowspan(V4H[2]4 ) ≈ · · · ≈ rowspan(VNH[2]N ). (73)
Such over-constrained linear systems for large N are a canonical challenge in interference align-
ment. Exact solutions may not exist and we have replaced the exact equality ‘=’ with approximate
equality ‘≈’. A well-known technique is to employ CJ asymptotic interference alignment [6], which
however, requires diagonal channel (key) matrices. The solution of (73) turns out to be the gener-
alization of CJ asymptotic interference alignment from single antenna to multiple antenna wireless
systems [15–17]. In short, when H
[1]
q ,H
[2]
q , q ∈ [3 : N ] are generic diagonal matrices, we can find
an asymptotic interference alignment based solution to (73). The details are deferred to the proof
of the theorem stated below in Section 6.5.
Theorem 6 For generic secure groupcast with either N > 2, E = 2 or N = 2, E > 2, if γ = 2 and
the keys zk, k ∈ [1 : N + E] are
zk = H
[1]
k s1:d +H
[2]
k sd+1:2d (74)
where H
[1]
k ,H
[2]
k ∈ Fd×dp are generic diagonal matrices, i.e., each diagonal element of H[1]k ,H[2]k is
drawn independently and uniformly from Fp and all non-diagonal elements are equal to zero, then
C(γ = 2) = 2/3. When E > 2, the achievable scheme has  leakage, i.e., I(W ;X,Zk) = o(d).
Remark 1 Note that Theorem 6 requires generic diagonal key matrices, which satisfy commuta-
tivity - the key for alignment to be possible in over-constrained systems. The case with generic full
key matrices (each element randomly drawn with no fixed zeros, see (36)) is generally open.
Note that Theorem 6 states that we may either increase N or E, without decreasing the capacity.
Interestingly, the case of increasing E turns out to be somewhat the dual of increasingN . When only
N is increased, we design the key space of X, rowspan(V) first (fully determined by qualified keys
z1, · · · , zN ), and then find the overlaps with the eavesdropping keys zN+1, · · · , zK to determine
the message space of X, rowspan(VW ) (refer to (67)), i.e., from V to VW . When only E is
increased, the order is reversed. Specifically, we design the overlap of the key space of X with
the eavesdropping keys zN+1, · · · , zK first (fully determined by alignment constraints among the
eavesdropping keys) such that rowspan(VW ) is set as the orthogonal space, and then find the key
space of X, rowspan(V) to have the desired determined overlaps with the eavesdropping keys, i.e.,
from VW to V. Further, rowspan(V) must be designed so that its overlap with each qualified key
has sufficient dimensions to ensure correctness. The details are presented in Section 6.5.
Remark 2 We have only considered the case of either increasing N or increasing E above. What
if we simultaneously increase N and E? This is an open problem and the ideas presented above
may not suffice because the design of V (fully determined by qualified keys for large N) and VW
(fully determined by eavesdropping keys for large E) is not compatible in general.
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6 Proofs
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1: Capacity of SG4
We present the achievability and converse proofs in the following two sections.
6.1.1 Achievability: R ≥ 4
To send LW = 4 message symbols W1:4 with L = 1 key block, we set the transmit signal X =
(X1;X2) as follows. Note that X contains two independent parts X1 ∈ F4×1p and X2 ∈ F4×1p .
X1 =

W1 + s4
W2 + s5 + s6
−2W1 − 3W2 + s8
W1 + 2W2 + s7 + s9
 , X2 =

W3 + s10
W4 + s11 + s12
−2W3 − 3W4 + s14
W3 + 2W4 + s13 + s15
 . (75)
Correctness (25) follows from the observation that qualified Receiver 1 knows s4:6, s10:12 and
can obtain the message symbols W1:4 from the first two rows of X1, X2, and qualified Receiver 2
knows s7:9, s13:15 and can obtain the message symbols W1:4 from the last two rows of X1, X2.
Consider security (26) and the eavesdropping Receiver 3. Note that the overlap of the key space
of X1 and the eavesdropping key z3 is
s4 + s5 + s6 + s8 + s7 + s9, (76)
i.e., the sum of all four rows of X1. The projection of the message symbols to this space is
W1 +W2 + (−2W1 − 3W2) + (W1 + 2W2) = 0 (77)
so that nothing is revealed. The case with X2 is similar, i.e., from X1, X2, z3, we obtain no
information about W . Consider eavesdropping Receiver 4. The overlap of the key space of X1 and
the eavesdropping key z4 is
2s4 + (s5 + s6) + 3s8 + 4(s7 + s9) = 2(s4 + 2s7) + (s5 + 3s8) + (s6 + 4s9), (78)
i.e., [2, 1, 3, 4]1×4 ×X1. The projection of the message symbols to this space is
2W1 +W2 + 3(−2W1 − 3W2) + 4(W1 + 2W2) = 0 (79)
so that nothing is revealed from (X1, X2, z4). The achievability proof of Lemma 1 is complete.
6.1.2 Converse: R ≤ 4
We use Theorem 5 and Theorem 1. Set uE = s1:3 in Theorem 5, then we have
⇒ R+ I(X;W,Z1:4|UE)/L ≤ 2H(z1:4|uE)−H(z3|uE)−H(z4|uE) (80)
= 2× 12− (6 + 6) = 12. (81)
Set Q = {1, 2} and ue = uE = s1:3 in Theorem 1, then we have
I(X;W,Z1:4|UE)/L ≥ 2R−
(
H(z3|uE) +H(z4|uE)−H(z3, z4|uE)
)
(82)
= 2R− (6 + 6− 12) = 2R. (83)
Combining with the above two inequalities, we have the desired outer bound,
3R ≤ 12 ⇒ R ≤ 4. (84)
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6.2 Proof of Theorem 3: Extreme γ Regimes
6.2.1 Large γ: γ ≥ min(N + 1, E + 1)
The converse proof follows immediately from Theorem 1. From (6), ∀q ∈ [1 : N ], ∀e ∈ [N + 1 : K]
we have
R ≤ H(zq|ze) ≤ H(zq) = rank(Hq) ≤ d. (85)
Note that R/d ≤ 1 always holds, e.g., there is no probabilistic argument involved.
The achievability proof has two parts. First, we show that when γ ≥ N+1, R = d is achievable.
Consider L = 1 key block, and the message has d symbols, W ∈ Fd×1p . We set
X =

W + z1
W + z2
...
W + zN
 ∈ FNd×1p (86)
where zq ∈ Fd×1p , q ∈ [1 : N ] and ‘+’ represents element-wise addition. Correctness constraint (25)
is always satisfied because each qualified Receiver q can use zq to obtain W from X. For security
(26), we require that ∀e ∈ [N + 1 : K]
(z1, z2, · · · , zN ) is independent of ze (87)
⇐ HQ∪{e} , [H1; H2; · · · ; HN ; He](N+1)d×m has full row rank (88)
which holds almost surely because m = γd ≥ (N + 1)d and each element of HQ∪{e} is drawn
independently and uniformly from Fp. Consider the determinant of any (N + 1)d× (N + 1)d sub-
matrix of HQ∪{e} and view the determinant as a polynomial, whose variables are the elements of
HQ∪{e}. This polynomial is not the zero polynomial so that by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [18–20],
the probability that the determinant is not zero approaches 1 as the field size p approaches infinity,
i.e., (88) holds almost surely. As (88) holds with probability approaching 1 for each e ∈ [N+1 : K],
the probability that (88) holds for all e ∈ [N + 1 : K] also approaches 1, i.e., the security constraint
(26) is satisfied almost surely.
Second, we show that when γ ≥ E + 1, R = d is achievable. Set L = 1 and
X = VWW + s (89)
where X, s ∈ Fm×1p ,VW ∈ Fm×dp ,W ∈ Fd×1p and VW is chosen so that
HN+1
HN+2
...
HK

Ed×m︸ ︷︷ ︸
,HE
VW = 0Ed×d. (90)
Note that m = γd ≥ (E + 1)d, i.e., m − Ed ≥ d, so the right null space of HE has at least d
dimensions, i.e., VW exists and can be chosen as any d linearly independent column vectors from
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the right null space. This choice of VW ensures security (26) and we verify correctness (25). We
require that ∀q ∈ [1 : N ], from HqX = HqVWW + zq, we can decode W , i.e.,
rank(HqVW ) = d. (91)
We similarly invoke the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [18–20]. To this end, view the determinant of
HqVW as a polynomial in variables of the elements of Hk, k ∈ [1 : K]. This polynomial is not the
zero polynomial because it is not always zero, e.g., we may assign the matrices Hk as follows,
HE =
[
IEd×Ed 0Ed×(m−Ed)
]
, Hq =
[
0d×(m−d) Id×d
]
(92)
so that
VW =
[
0(m−d)×d
Id×d
]
, HqVW = Id×d ⇒ det(HqVW ) = 1 6= 0. (93)
As a result, the non-zero polynomial will not be zero with probability approaching 1 as p → ∞.
As (91) holds with probability approaching 1 for each q ∈ [1 : N ], the probability that (91) holds
for all q ∈ [1 : N ] also approaches 1, i.e., the correctness constraint (25) is satisfied almost surely.
6.2.2 Small γ: γ ≤ max(1 + 1/N, 1 + 1/E)
We use Theorem 1 to prove the converse. From (6), ∀q ∈ [1 : N ],∀e ∈ [N + 1 : e] we have
R ≤ H(zq|ze) = H(zq, ze)−H(ze) ≤ H(s)−H(ze) = m− rank(He) (94)
which is equal to m− d almost surely, as He contains d generic rows. Thus R/d ≤ m/d− 1 = γ− 1
almost surely.
We now consider the achievability proof, which has two parts. First, we show that, when
γ ≤ 1 + 1/N , R = m− d is achievable. Set L = 1 and
X = W +HQs (95)
where X,W ∈ F(m−d)×1p ,HQ ∈ F(m−d)×mp , s ∈ Fm×1p and HQ is chosen so that
HQ = P1H1 = P2H2 = · · · = PNHN (96)
⇐ 0(m−d)×(N−1)m =
[
P1 P2 · · · PN
]
(m−d)×Nd

H1 H1 · · · H1
−H2 0d×m · · · 0d×m
0d×m −H3 · · · 0d×m
...
...
. . .
...
0d×m 0d×m · · · −HN

Nd×(N−1)m︸ ︷︷ ︸
,HB
,
HQ = P1H1. (97)
Note that Nd− (N −1)m = m−N(γ−1)d ≥ m−d, so the left null space of HB has at least m−d
dimensions, i.e., Pq, q ∈ [1 : N ] exists and can be chosen as any m − d linearly independent row
vectors from the left null space. Then HQ exists and this choice of HQ ensures correctness (25),
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because any qualified Receiver q ∈ [1 : N ] can obtain HQs = Pqzq and then extract W from X.
Next, consider security (26). We require that ∀e ∈ [N + 1 : K]
HQ∪{e} , [HQ; He]m×m has full rank almost surely (98)
which follows from the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [18–20] and the determinant polynomial of HQ∪{e}
is not the zero polynomial (easy to see as HQ only depends on the qualified key matrices Hq, q ∈
[1 : N ], which is independent of the eavesdropping key matrix He). Thus the security constraint
(26) is satisfied almost surely over large fields, i.e., when p→∞.
Second, we show that when γ ≤ 1 + 1/E, R = m− d is achievable. Set L = 1 and
X =
(
HE s
W +Hrand s
)
(99)
where X ∈ F2(m−d)×1p ,HE ,Hrand ∈ F(m−d)×mp ,W ∈ F(m−d)×1p , s ∈ Fm×1p and HE ,Hrand are chosen
as follows.
Each element of Hrand is drawn independently and uniformly from Fp and (100)
rowspan(HE) = rowspan(HN+1) ∩ rowspan(HN+2) ∩ · · · ∩ rowspan(HK) (101)
⇐ HE = PN+1HN+1 = PN+2HN+2 = · · · = PKHK , Pe ∈ F(m−d)×dp , e ∈ [N + 1 : K](102)
where HE can be solved in the same manner as (97) because the overlap of the row spaces of He
has sufficient dimensions, i.e., Ed − (E − 1)m = m − E(γ − 1)d ≥ m − d. To ensure correctness
(25), we require
[HE ; Hq]m×m has full rank almost surely , ∀q ∈ [1 : N ] (103)
whose proof follows similarly from that of (98). Then each qualified Receiver q can recover s from
HE s and the key zq = Hqs, and obtain Hrand s (so that W is decoded with no error). To ensure
security (26), we require
Hrand∪{e} , [Hrand; He]m×m has full rank almost surely , ∀e ∈ [N + 1 : K] (104)
which follows from the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [18–20] and the determinant polynomial of Hrand∪{e}
is not the zero polynomial (trivial as we may find a realization of Hrand and Hk, k ∈ [1 : K] such
that Hrand∪{e} is an identity matrix). To sum up, both correctness constraint (25) and security
constraint (26) are satisfied almost surely over a sufficiently large field. The proof of Theorem 3 is
now complete.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 4: N = E = 2
As the regimes where 1 ≤ γ ≤ 3/2 and γ ≥ 3 have been covered by Theorem 3, we only need to
consider the remaining three regimes, which are discussed sequentially as follows.
6.3.1 5/2 ≤ γ ≤ 3
Converse follows from Theorem 1. From (6), we have R ≤ H(zq|ze) ≤ H(zq) = rank(Hq) ≤ d,∀q ∈
{1, 2},∀e ∈ {3, 4}.
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Achievability of R = d is similar to that of Example 3. Set L = 1 and the transmit signal as
X = VWW +Vs = VWW +
[
H1
H2
]
s = VWW +
[
z1
z2
]
(105)
where X ∈ F2d×1p ,VW ∈ F2d×dp ,W ∈ Fd×1p ,V ∈ F2d×mp , s ∈ Fm×1p ,H1,H2 ∈ Fd×mp , and VW is
designed as follows,[
U3
U4
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2(3d−m)×2d
VW = 0, i.e., VW exists as 2d− 2(3d−m) ≥ d (γ ≥ 5/2), (106)
where for e ∈ {3, 4}, [Ue −Pe](3d−m)×3d
[
V
He
]
3d×m
= 0. (107)
Note that V is fully determined by H1,H2, which is independent of He, so Ue (obtained from the
overlap of the row space of V and the row space of He) will have dimension 3d − m with high
probability. Security (26) is guaranteed by (106). For correctness (25), we require that
VW (1 : d, :),VW (d+ 1 : 2d, :) both have full rank (108)
which is proved by showing that the determinant polynomials (of variables from Hk, k ∈ [1 : 4])
are not the zero polynomial so that by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [18–20], the two matrices have
full rank almost surely as p → ∞. The determinant polynomials are non-zero for the following
realization of Hk so that they are not always zero.
H1s = s1:d, H2s = s(d+1):2d (109)
H3s = (s1:(3d−m) + s(d+1):(4d−m); s(2d+1):m) (110)
H4s = (s(3d−m+1):2(3d−m) + s(4d−m+1):(7d−2m); s(2d+1):m) (111)[
U3
U4
]
= [I2(3d−m)×2(3d−m) 02(3d−m)×(2m−5d) I2(3d−m)×2(3d−m) 02(3d−m)×(2m−5d)] (112)
VW = [Id×d;−Id×d]. (113)
The proof of achievability when 5/2 ≤ γ ≤ 3 is complete.
6.3.2 2 ≤ γ ≤ 5/2
We first provide the converse proof. In Theorem 5, we set uE = (). Note that γ ≥ 2 so the
eavesdropping keys z3, z4 are independent almost surely, i.e., the condition of Theorem 5 is satisfied.
Then we have
R+ I(X;W,Z1:4)/L ≤ 2H(z1:4)−H(z3)−H(z4) = 2m− 2d (114)
almost surely as the keys are generic. Then we apply Theorem 1. In (7), we set Q = {1, 2} and it
follows that
I(X;W,Z1:4)/L ≥ 2R− (H(z1, z2)−H(z1)−H(z2)) = 2R (115)
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almost surely. Note that when γ ≥ 2, the qualified keys z1, z2 are independent almost surely.
Combining the two inequalities above, we have
3R ≤ 2m− 2d ⇒ R(γ) = R/d ≤ 2(m− d)/(3d) = 2(γ − 1)/3 (116)
and the converse proof when 2 ≤ γ ≤ 5/2 is complete.
We next provide the achievability proof, which is very similar to that presented in the previous
section and only the parameters need to be adjusted to match the current γ regime. As the
normalized rate R(γ) = 2(γ−1)/3 may not be an integer, we consider spatial extension by a factor
of 3, i.e., set d′ = 3d,m′ = 3m and show that R = 2(m′− d′)/3 = 2(m− d) is achievable when each
key is 3d generic combinations of 3m basis symbols. Set L = 1 and
X = VWW +Vs = VWW +
[
H1(1 : 2(m− d), :)
H2(1 : 2(m− d), :)
]
s (117)
where X ∈ F4(m−d)×1p ,VW ∈ F4(m−d)×2(m−d)p ,W ∈ F2(m−d)×1p ,V ∈ F4(m−d)×3mp , s ∈ F3m×1p . Note
that 2(m− d) ≤ 3d as γ ≤ 5/2. VW is designed so that[
U3
U4
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2(m−d)×4(m−d)
VW = 0, where for e ∈ {3, 4}, [Ue −Pe]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(m−d)×(4m−d)
[
V
He
]
(4m−d)×3m
= 0. (118)
Security (26) is guaranteed by (118). For correctness (25), we require that
VW (1 : 2(m− d), :),VW (2(m− d) + 1 : 4(m− d), :) both have full rank (119)
which is similarly proved by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [18–20] and the property that the deter-
minant polynomials (of variables from Hk, k ∈ [1 : 4]) are not the zero polynomial. The following
realization of Hk shows that the determinant polynomials are not always zero.
H1(1 : 2(m− d), :)s = s1:2(m−d), H2(1 : 2(m− d)), :)s = s(2m−2d+1):4(m−d) (120)
H3s = (s1:(m−d) + s(2m−2d+1):3(m−d); s(4m−4d+1):3m) (121)
H4s = (s(m−d+1):2(m−d) + s(3m−3d+1):4(m−d); s(4m−4d+1):3m) (122)[
U3
U4
]
= [I2(m−d)×2(m−d) I2(m−d)×2(m−d)], VW =
[
I2(m−d)×2(m−d)
−I2(m−d)×2(m−d)
]
. (123)
The proof of achievability when 2 ≤ γ ≤ 5/2 is complete.
6.3.3 3/2 ≤ γ ≤ 5/3
Converse follows from (6) in Theorem 1. R ≤ H(zq|ze) = H(zq, ze)−H(ze) = m− d almost surely
as γ < 2 so that from zq, ze, we can recover s1:m with high probability.
For achievability, we note that there is a (2d−m)-dimensional overlap between H1 and H2 (the
two qualified keys),
H12 , V12H1, where [V12 −V21](2d−m)×2d
[
H1
H2
]
2d×m
= 0(2d−m)×m (124)
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and similarly, for the two eavesdropping receivers, H3 and H4 have a (2d−m)-dimensional overlap,
from which we will use 2m− 3d ≤ 2d−m (recall that γ ≤ 5/3) generic dimensions.
H34 , V34H3, where [V34 −V43](2m−3d)×2d
[
H3
H4
]
2d×m
= 0(2m−3d)×m. (125)
With high probability, H1 and H2 span the overall key space s1:m and we can express H34 as linear
combinations of the rows of H1 and H2.
H1
invertible←→ [H1(1 : m− d, :); H12], H2 invertible←→ [H2(1 : m− d, :);H12]; (126)
H34 = C1H1(1 : m− d, :) +C2H2(1 : m− d, :) +C12H12 (127)
where C1,C2 ∈ F(2m−3d)×(m−d)p ,C12 ∈ F(2m−3d)×(2d−m)p .
We wish to send LW = m−d message symbols W . Specifically, the first 2d−m message symbols
are denoted by W1 ∈ F(2d−m)×1p and last 2m−3d message symbols are denoted by W2 ∈ F(2m−3d)×1p .
The message W is sent over L = 1 key block and the transmit signal is set as
X =
 W1 +H12s1:mW2 +C1H1(1 : m− d, :)s1:m
−C12W1 −W2 +C2H2(1 : m− d, :)s1:m
 ∈ F(3m−4d)×1p . (128)
Correctness (25) is easily seen, as qualified Receiver 1 can obtain W1,W2 from the first two row
blocks of X, and qualified Receiver 2 can obtain W1,W2 from the first and third row block of
X. Security (26) holds because the overlap of each of z3, z4 (of dimension d) with the key space
of X (of dimension 3m− 4d) is H34 (of dimension d+ 3m− 4d−m = 2m− 3d), along which the
projection of W in X is null.
(Key space of X) ∩ rowspace(H3) = (Key space of X) ∩ rowspace(H4) = H34. (129)
Note that this design wherein both overlaps are the same space also follows from interference
alignment principles. We need to ensure that the overlap is only H34 with high probability, i.e.,
the direct sum of the key space in X and the row space of each of H3,H4 have full row rank almost
surely, which is formalized by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [18–20]. Note that the remaining rows of
H3 and H4 (except H34) are generated independently of H1,H2, so the determinant polynomials
of corresponding matrices contain distinct monomials and are thus non-zero.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 5: New Converse
Following the insights from (51), we consider the overlap of the transmit signal X and each eaves-
dropping key spaces Ze, e ∈ [N + 1 : K] conditioned on UE . On the one hand,
I(X;Ze|UE) (4)= I(X;Ze,W |UE) (130)
= I(X;Z1:K , Ze,W |UE)− I(X;Z1:K |Ze,W,UE) (131)
≥ I(X;Z1:K ,W |UE)−H(Z1:K |Ze,W,UE) (132)
(2)
= I(X;Z1:K ,W |UE)−H(Z1:K |UE) +H(Ze|UE) (133)
= I(X;Z1:K ,W |UE)−H(z1:K |uE)L+H(ze|uE)L. (134)
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On the other hand,
K∑
e=N+1
I(X;Ze|UE) ≤
K∑
e=N+1
I(X,ZN+1:e−1;Ze|UE) (135)
(56)
=
K∑
e=N+1
I(X;Ze|ZN+1:e−1, UE) (136)
= I(X;ZN+1:K |UE) (137)
≤ I(X;Z1:K |UE) (138)
= I(X;Z1:K ,W |UE)− I(X;W |Z1:K , UE) (139)
(3)
= I(X;Z1:K ,W |UE)−H(W |Z1:K , UE) (140)
(2)
= I(X;Z1:K ,W |UE)− LW . (141)
Adding (134) for all e ∈ [N + 1 : K] and combining with (141), we have
(K −N)
(
I(X;Z1:K ,W |UE)−H(z1:K |uE)L
)
+
K∑
e=N+1
H(ze|uE)L
≤ I(X;Z1:K ,W |UE)− LW (142)
⇒ LW + (K −N − 1)I(X;W,Z1:K |UE) ≤ (K −N)H(z1:K |uE)L−
K∑
e=N+1
H(ze|uE)L (143)
and normalizing by L gives us the desired bound.
6.5 Proof of Theorem 6: Asymptotic Alignment
Adding more receivers (qualified or eavesdropping) cannot help so that for the converse proof,
it suffices to consider the N = 2, E = 2 system. From Theorem 4, we have the desired bound
R(γ = 2) ≤ 2/3. Next, we provide the achievability proof, which is asymptotic, i.e., the normalized
R(γ = 2) approaches 2/3 when a parameter of the scheme goes to infinity.
6.5.1 Achievability when N > 2, E = 2
Suppose 2d/3 =
(
∆+1
2N
)
for some positive integer ∆ (later ∆ will be driven to infinity). Define a
matrix that is parameterized by ∆ and is comprised of a collection of row vectors as follows.
V∆ =
{
1
(∏
q1,q2
(H[1]q1 )
α
[1]
q1 (H[2]q2 )
α
[2]
q2
)
:
∑
q1,q2
(α[1]q1 + α
[2]
q2 ) ≤ ∆, α[1]q1 , α[2]q2 ∈ Z+, q1, q2 ∈ [1 : N ]
}
(144)
where 1 is the 1 × d all 1 row vector and Z+ is the set of positive integers. Thus V∆ contains
product terms up to degree ∆. The number of row vectors in V∆+1 is equal to
(
∆+1
2N
)
, which has
been set to 2d/3.
Set L = 1, LW =
(
∆
2N
)
< 2d/3, LX = 2
(
∆+1
2N
)
= 4d/3 and the transmit signal X as
X = VWW +
[
V∆+1 0
0 V∆+1
]
s1:2d = VWW +
[
V∆+1s1:d
V∆+1sd+1:2d
]
(145)
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where X ∈ FLX×1p ,VW ∈ FLX×LWp ,W ∈ FLW×1p . VW is designed so that[
UK−1
UK
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2d/3×4d/3
VW = 0, where for e ∈ {K − 1,K}, [Ue −Pe]︸ ︷︷ ︸
d/3×7d/3
 V∆+1 00 V∆+1
H
[1]
e H
[2]
e

︸ ︷︷ ︸
7d/3×2d
= 0. (146)
Note that LW < 2d/3 so that VW exists. Security (26) follows from (146) and V
∆+1 is determined
fully by qualified key matrices H
[1]
q ,H
[2]
q , q ∈ [1 : N ] thus Ue has d/3 rows almost surely. Correctness
(25) is due to the observation that ∀q ∈ [1 : N ]
V∆H[1]q ⊂ V∆+1,V∆H[2]q ⊂ V∆+1 (147)
⇒ V∆zq = V∆H[1]q s1:d +V∆H[2]q sd+1:2d (LW rows)
can be obtained from the rows of V∆+1s1:d,V
∆+1sd+1:2d
i.e., there exists Dq ∈ FLW×LXp s.t. Dq[V∆+1s1:d;V∆+1sd+1:2d] = V∆zq (148)
⇒ DqX −V∆zq = DqVWW (149)
so we need to ensure DqVW has full rank almost surely. The determinant polynomial of DqVW is
not always zero as there exists one such realization Hk, k ∈ [1 : K]. Finally, the normalized rate
achieved is
R(γ = 2) =
LW
d
=
(
∆
2N
)
3
2
(
∆+1
2N
) = 2
3
∆ + 1− 2N
∆ + 1
→ 2
3
as ∆→∞. (150)
6.5.2 Achievability when N = 2, E > 2
Suppose d/3 =
(
∆+1
2E
)
for some positive integer ∆. Define a matrix that is comprised of the following
row vectors. Note that K = E + 2 and receivers 3 to K are eavesdroppers.
V∆ =
{
1
(∏
e1,e2
(H[1]e1 )
α
[1]
e1 (H[2]e2 )
α
[2]
e2
)
:
∑
e1,e2
(α[1]e1 + α
[2]
e2 ) ≤ ∆, α[1]e1 , α[2]e2 ∈ Z+, e1, e2 ∈ [3 : K]
}
(151)
where 1 is the 1× d all 1 row vector and V∆ contains product terms up to degree ∆. The number
of row vectors in V∆+1 is equal to
(
∆+1
2E
)
, which has been set to d/3.
We wish to design the scheme so that the overlap of each eavesdropping key and the key
space of X belongs to the space spanned by [V∆+1s1:d; V
∆+1sd+1:2d]. To this end, we wish to
see how to create this space from the qualified keys. As γ = 2, so the qualified keys z1, z2 are
invertible to all 2d basis key symbols almost surely. Define H12 , [H1; H2], s1:2d , H12s1:2d, then
z1 = s1:d, z2 = sd+1:2d. The 2d × 2d square matrix H12 is invertible almost surely, i.e., inv(H12)
exists. We define the four d× d sub-matrix of inv(H12) as follows,
inv(H12) =
[
inv[11](H12) inv
[12](H12)
inv[21](H12) inv
[22](H12)
]
∈ F2d×2dp , inv[ij](H12) ∈ Fd×dp , i, j ∈ {1, 2} (152)
and then we have[
V∆+1s1:d
V∆+1sd+1:2d
]
=
[
V∆+1 0
0 V∆+1
]
s1:2d (153)
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=[
V∆+1 0
0 V∆+1
]
inv(H12)s1:2d (154)
=
[
V∆+1 0
0 V∆+1
] [
inv[11](H12) inv
[12](H12)
inv[21](H12) inv
[22](H12)
]
s1:2d (155)
=
[
V∆+1inv[11](H12)z1 +V
∆+1inv[12](H12)z2
V∆+1inv[21](H12)z1 +V
∆+1inv[22](H12)z2
]
(156)
Set L = 1, LW = 2d/3, LX = 4d/3 and the transmit signal X as
X = VWW +Vs1:2d =

W1:d/3
Wd/3+1:2d/3
−W1:d/3
−Wd/3+1:2d/3
+

V∆+1inv[11](H12)z1
V∆+1inv[21](H12)z1
V∆+1inv[12](H12)z2
V∆+1inv[22](H12)z2
 (157)
where X ∈ FLX×1p ,VW ∈ FLX×LWp ,W ∈ FLW×1p ,V ∈ FLX×2dp .
We prove that the scheme is correct and the leakage is small compared to d. Correctness (25)
follows from the observation that from the first two row blocks of X, qualified Receiver 1 can
decode all LW = 2d/3 symbols of W , and from the last two row blocks of X, qualified Receiver 2
can decode all LW = 2d/3 symbols of W . Next, consider security (26). Note that ∀e ∈ [3 : K]
V∆H[1]e ⊂ V∆+1,V∆H[2]e ⊂ V∆+1 (158)
⇒ rowspan([V∆H[1]e V∆H[2]e ]) ⊂ rowspan
([
V∆+1 0
0 V∆+1
])
(159)
⇒ V∆ze = V∆H[1]e s1:d +V∆H[2]e sd+1:2d can be obtained from[
V∆+1 0
0 V∆+1
]
s1:2d =
[
V∆+1s1:d
V∆+1sd+1:2d
]
. (160)
The row space of ze (of dimension of d) and the key space of X (of dimension 4d/3) have overlap
of d + 4d/3 − 2d = d/3 dimensions with high probability (easily verified by showing that the
determinant polynomials are non-zero). The row space of V∆ belongs to this overlap as it can be
obtained from Vs1:2d (which follows from the design of the scheme, refer to (156), (157), (160)).
Further, the dimension of the row space of V∆ is equal to the number of row vectors in V∆ with
high probability, which is
(
∆
2E
)
. The projection of the message W in the transmit signal X to this
overlapping space V∆ze is zero thus nothing is revealed. Except from (orthogonal to) the row space
of V∆, the remaining overlap of the row space of ze and the key space of X has dimension at most
d/3− dim (rowspace(V∆)) = (∆ + 1
2E
)
−
(
∆
2E
)
(161)
⇒ d/3− dim
(
rowspace(V∆)
)
d
=
1
3
(
1−
(
∆
2E
)(
∆+1
2E
)) = 2E
3(∆ + 1)
→ 0 as ∆, d →∞. (162)
Therefore, the leakage vanishes with the spatial dimension d. As we allow d to approach infinity, the
normalized leakage is negligible, i.e., I(W ;X,Ze) = o(d) (the derivation is the  leakage relaxation
of the zero leakage counterpart in (35)).
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7 Conclusion
In this work, we show that for the secure groupcast problem which involves no noise, the communi-
cate rate is not fully specified by the source variables in the problem statement. As a result, a more
general entropic description that includes auxiliary variables for the achievability and converse is
required. Additional insights are necessary to reveal the structure of auxiliary variables.
We also study the generic secure groupcast problem where each key is comprised of a number
of generic linear combinations. The groupcast rate is measured as a function of the ratio of the
dimension of the overall key space to the dimension of each receiver’s key space. The feasibility
of linear schemes is stated in terms of space projections and overlaps, which leads to the natural
application of various interference alignment schemes originated in wireless communications. While
complete answers are obtained when the overall key space is either large or small, the intermediate
cases are open and call for more advanced techniques.
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